Deregulation was a political buzzword of the early 1980's. The Reagan Administration came to power on a platform dedicated to getting government "off the backs of the people." Deregulation promised to lower inflation, raise productivity, and reverse the sagging fortunes of American industry. And proponents declared deregulation morally right because it constituted a rollback of the arbitrary power of the state in favor of individual initiative and liberty. But the actual politics of deregulation, including the momentous breakup of AT&T, had already turned out to be far more complex than this rhetoric suggested. In The Irony of Regulatory Reform Horwitz examines the history of telecommunications--both telephone and broadcast--to build a compelling new theory of regulation. Against the backdrop of modern theories of the state, he presents a sweeping survey of the history of regulation in America, delineating three distinct periods of regulatory genesis and, correspondingly, three discrete types of agencies. Horwitz shows the underlying irony that while anti-regulation rhetoric was aimed at the so-called "social" regulatory agencies, in practice it has been the "economic" agencies that have been deregulated, often with vehement opposition from the industries affected. Within the context of this broader theory, telecommunications is a fascinating industry to study, because it determines the character of our marketplace of ideas, because it has been an arena of great technological transformation, and because of its fundamental role in anchoring the so-called "information age." Horwitz unveils the complex mosaic of forces--economic, political, legal, and technological--that undermined the traditional regulation of telecommunications and precipitated deregulation.

Markets, not politics, are driving health care reform in America today. Inventive entrepreneurs have transformed medicine over the past ten years, and no end to this period of rapid change is in sight. Consumer anxieties over managed care are mounting, and medical costs are again soaring. Meanwhile, the federal government remains mostly on the health policy sidelines, as it has since the collapse of the Clinton administration's campaign for health care reform. This book addresses the changes that the market has wrought- and the challenges this transformation poses for courts and regulators. The law that governs the medical marketplace is an incomplete, overlapping patchwork, conceived mainly without medical care specifically in mind. The ensuing confusion and incoherence are a central theme of this book. Fragmentation of health care lawmaking has foreclosed coordinated, system-wide policy responses, and lack of national consensus on many of the central questions in health care policy has translated into legal contradiction and bitter controversy. Written by leading commentators on American health law and policy, this book examines the widely-perceived failings of managed care and the law's relationship to them. Some of the contributors treat law as a cause of trouble; others emphasize the law's potential and limits as a corrective tool when the market disappoints. The first two chapters present contrasting overviews of how the doctrines and decision-makers that constitute health law work together, for better or worse, to constrain the medical marketplace. The next six chapters address particular market developments and regulatory dilemmas. These include the power of state versus federal government in the health sphere, conflict between insureres and patients and providers over medical need, financial rewards to physicians for frugal practice, the role of antitrust law in the organization of health care provision and financing, the future of public hospitals, and the place of investor-owned versus non-profit institutions. Acknowledging the health sphere's complexities, the authors seek remedies that fit this country's legal, political, and cultural constraints and can contribute to reasoned regulatory goverance. Within limits they believe a measure of rationality is possible.